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1. ABSTRACT
A key research priority for the next decade is
the protection of critical, software-intensive
infrastructures—e.g., electric power, banking,
telecommunications, and transportation.  The
problem is complicated by the need to enhance
existing systems.  We describe one approach to
survivability enhancement. In 1997 the Internet
failed when corrupt data was disseminated at
the top level of the Domain Name System.  We
replicated this failure and developed a solution
based on transparent insertion of mediators to
enforce survivability policies. Our approach
promises to ease survivability enhancement in
two ways: transparent insertion eases system
architectural evolution; and modularization of
survivability policy implementations eases the
evolution of both survivability policies and the
systems into which our mediators are inserted.
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2. INTRODUCTION
The survivability of software-intensive infrastructures—
e.g., electric power, transportation, banking and finance
and telecommunications—has emerged as a major concern
of government and industry and as an important research
topic [3][4][5][6].  By survivability, we mean, informally,
assured continuity of essential infrastructure services under
defined adverse conditions: natural, accidental or hostile.
Society depends on critical infrastructures for heat, light,
food, emergency services, commerce, etc. The use of
software-intensive subsystems within infrastructures
creates enormous value, but such software systems are also
complex and fragile. They support multiple functions; are
highly distributed; sometimes reactive; in some cases have
real-time requirements; and they embed a great deal of
domain-specific knowledge. The deep and rapidly growing
reliance of critical infrastructures on such information
systems thus puts society at risk.
For example, the transition to the Internet as a medium for
commerce provides for enormous efficiency in economic
transactions; yet, the Internet is fragile and thus prone to
catastrophic failure. Failures that have already occurred
make it clear that the risks are not merely speculative [10].
The problem of the survivability of information-intensive
infrastructures is compounded by their reliance on
complex, aged software—i.e., legacy systems—and on
extensive use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
components.  Unfortunately, redesigning such systems
from scratch for survivability is untenable. Recent
experiences with the United States Internal Revenue
Service, air traffic control, and other such critical systems
show that we do not necessarily have the intellectual or
monetary capital to succeed in such demanding tasks [3].
On the other hand, evolving complex existing systems
presents its own challenges. Yet, given that we do now and
will continue to depend on existing systems, survivability
enhancement emerges as an important topic. Of particular
interest are enhancement techniques operating at the
architecture level, because it is at this level that key
system-wide properties are enabled, if not assured.
We report on an experimental systems project undertaken
within a broader program on survivability architecture
[1][2][9].  The infrastructure is the Internet.  We studied
the embedded information system called the Domain
Name Service (DNS). The failure of DNS in 1997 brought
down a large part of the Internet [10].  We describe the
survivability enhancement of DNS by the transparent
architectural insertion of a survivability mediator into
DNS. The mediator approach [7][8] was developed to ease
the design and evolution of complex integrated systems.
3. BACKGROUND
DNS is a distributed application that enables Internet
addressing based on mnemonic Internet host names, such
as www.virginia.edu.  DNS resolves such names to
numerical addresses, such as 128.143.136.15, that network
routers can use directly in the routing of Internet Protocol
(IP) packets.
DNS is a hierarchically structured, distributed system that
manages a database of name-to-address mappings.  The
root level of the hierarchy, illustrated in Figure 1, provides
translations for partial names such as .com and .net.
When a user requires a name translation, the local DNS
database is queried.  If there is no local translation, the
query is sent up the hierarchy, eventually reaching a
secondary root server.  If no translation is found there, the
user receives an error message saying that the name could
not be resolved.
The software running on both primary and secondary
server nodes is called Berkley Internet Name Domain
(BIND).  BIND is implemented in about 30,000 lines of C
code.  By any measure BIND is a simple infrastructure
information   system.  Yet is has attractions as a subject for
research.  First, it is a real system.  Second, unlike most
infrastructure information systems, it is amenable to study
in a research setting.  Versions of the code are widely
available and written in C.  Finally, it is the software for a
real critical infrastructure, the failure of which lead to a
massive outage.  The DNS size is not representative, but
DNS is nevertheless useful as a specimen for experimental
systems research.
The set of existing Internet names changes continually.
The primary and secondary servers, running BIND,
engage in a protocol that results in top-level database
updates being propagated from the primary to secondary
servers (arrows in Figure 1).  The 1997 failure occurred
when, owing to an operator ignoring an alarm, the primary
server at Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) passed an empty
database to eight secondary root servers.   This failure
disabled the root level translation of names ending in .com
and .net. Because these servers serve most of the Internet,
the data corruption effectively erased the .com and .net
Internet domains.
The error occurred at 2:30 AM EST and so had a greater
impact in Europe than in the United States. However, over
one million companies have domains within .com and .net.
The primary server database was corrected by 6:30 AM
EST, but the secondary servers had to manually reload the
“zone data.”  The effects of the problem lasted into the
afternoon [4]. The damage was not great owing to the still
limited dependence of the economy on the Internet and to
the timing of the outage.  However, that such a massive
failure could result from a simple operator error evinces
the fragility of information-intensive infrastructures.
Although the scale of DNS is small, it failure modes are
representative.  The failures that we pinpoint are operator
error and dissemination of corrupted information within
an infrastructure.  The DNS failure also shows that
traditional techniques for improving reliability are
inadequate to assure infrastructure survivability. First, data
corruption occurred when a human operator at NSI caused
a mangled database to be sent to secondary servers despite
an alarm indicating that there was a problem.  An
accidental error or malicious act by one person should not
be allowed to lead to massive infrastructure outages.
Second, the traditional hardware  approach to availability
through replication—in this case in the form of secondary
servers—was of no potential use.  The data were bad, not
the systems for manipulating them.
4. APPROACH
The approach to survivability enhancement that we have
explored is based the insertion of survivability mediators
into infrastructure information systems at the architectural
level.  A mediator is a software module that is interposed
transparently between other modules of a system, and that
serves two purposes, one functional, one evolutionary.
First, a mediator enforces a specified behavioral
relationship among the mediated modules.  Second, the
mediator eases evolution in two ways.  Transparent
insertion eases architectural evolution; and the information
hiding encapsulation of the implementation of the
specified behavioral relationship permits the relationship
and the rest of the system to evolve largely independently
of each other.
A survivability mediator is a mediator that enforces a
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Figure 1. Basic architecture of the root level of the internet domain name service
survivability requirement that we chose to explore is one
that could have averted the Internet failure that actually
occurred: DNS must continue to provide the domain name
service to users, albeit perhaps with degraded accuracy,
even in the face of corrupted data being sent from the
primary root server.
Figure 2 illustrates the mediator-based architectural
change that we made to effect this survivability
enhancement.  We introduced a mediator between the
primary and each of the secondary root servers.  The figure
shows the change for just one secondary server.  Because
DNS servers running BIND communicate using TCP/IP,
and because the interconnection of BIND nodes is
programmed in text-based configuration files, inserting the
mediator required only that these files be changed to cause
BIND nodes to communicate through the mediator rather
than directly.
The mediator waits for connections from the primary or
the secondary server, buffers the message being sent, then
implements policy actions depending on the content seen.
For instance, in an early prototype, if the database file that
is sent from the primary to the secondary is found to be
empty, the mediator discards the message.
Unfortunately, this policy turned out not to meet the
desired survivability requirement.  Merely quashing
messages is  not enough, because database entries on
secondary servers time out.  In the absence of periodic
updates from the primary, the name service provided by
the secondary servers evaporates quickly.  The requirement
is thus that secondary servers see a steady stream of valid
updates.
Our next policy was to have the mediator maintain a copy
of the last valid database sent from the primary to the
secondary, and to re-send the copy if a corrupted database
were detected.  This policy was also inadequate.  A
secondary server requests an update from the primary
when its sees that its cached databases is older than the
one available on the primary.  When it receives a new one
from the primary, it checks its contents to ensure that it
bears a time-stamp matching the one on which the request
was based.  A mere copy the old database is not valid.
The policy that finally worked was to send the old database
with appropriate edits to ensure that the secondary accepts
it as valid.  Our mediator thus forwards clever counterfeits.
In addition to recognizing empty databases as corrupt, we
explored policies based on unexpected changes in size.
The point is not that complex policies are needed. That an
alarm was sounded at NSI but ignored in the actual
incident shows that error detection was not the problem.
The problem was in enforcing a critical integrity
constraint.  Anticipating data corruption as an important
failure mode, assessing the risk of occurrence, and taking
appropriate actions at the architectural design level shows
promise as a strategy for infrastructure survivability
enhancement.
5. CONCLUSION
Our mediator approach eased the evolutionary
survivability enhancement of a critical infrastructure
system by allowing us to impose a new integrity constraint
without changes to the existing source code.  Enhancement
will not be so easy for all systems; but transparent
insertion of mediators at natural architectural boundaries
is a general strategy independent of the type of boundary:
CORBA procedure invocation, Internet event notification,
file system call, etc.
The mediator approach has the added benefit of localizing
the survivability policy implementation, making it possible
to change both it and the surrounding system
independently.  We exploited this dimension of
evolvability in exploring a range of policy specifications
and implementations.  In general, policy evolution
promises to be important for future infrastructure
information systems—e.g., to keep pace with increasing
capabilities of hostile adversaries.
Critical systems with policy enforcement mechanisms
often have overrides.  A nuclear-powered submarine has a
battle short to enable necessary but dangerous power
generation in combat.  Such features in infrastructures
(e.g., ability of managers to approve transmission of
corrupted data) should perhaps be explicit in survivability
requirements.  Adding except in case of management
override to our policy for DNS might make sense, for
example.  This extension could be made with local
changes to our survivability mediator.
One of the authors (Shaw) developed the first survivability
mediator for DNS as part of a senior undergraduate thesis
project.  A major part of the effort was in his
understanding BIND—30K lines of arcane TCP/IP







Figure 2.  Simplified architecture of DNS hardened with a survivability mediator
the hooks to manipulate the BIND communication
streams.  If Shaw been an expert, he would have found the
hooks quickly.  On the other hand, his experience gives an
indication of the difficulties that probably await those
undertaking survivability enhancement of large and poorly
documented infrastructures. In the end we only had to
understand in depth those parts of BIND that are involved
in zone (database) updates.  Our mediator code is much
less complex than BIND: about 3,000 lines.
 “Reifying connectors” is not a new idea.  It is the heart of
the mediator concept, for example [7][8].  In this paper,
we presented a case study on adapting this technique to the
survivability enhancement of critical infrastructures.  In an
experimental systems study, we applied the technique to
mitigate the failure mode exhibited in the 1997
catastrophic failure of one critical infrastructure—the
Internet.
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